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Precarity is widely regarded as a defining condition of advanced capitalist societies. Given its 
existentially troubling character and a range of movements condemning its social consequences, 
several contemporary analysts have sought to diagnose the prospects for liberating society from its 
rule. Many of those accounts have been inspired by the post-structuralism of Michel Foucault. It is 
nevertheless argued here that Pierre Bourdieu offers more suitable conceptual tools for diagnosing 
precarity-induced domination and making sense of resistance in the contemporary age of precarity. 
With a focus on Foucault’s neoliberal ‘art of government’ and Bourdieu’s concept of ‘symbolic power,’ 
this article exposes the differences between each theorist’s account of precarity. While doing so will 
help grasp the complex and singular character of the operations of power today, it will also serve to 
highlight the merits of Bourdieu’s work for capturing the limits of, and cracks within, precarity-induced 
domination. Realising the full potential of his own approach for conceptualising resistance, however, 
rests on supplementing it with insights drawn from intersectionality theory. 
 
 




Although the term precarity first appeared in France in the 1970s (Standing, 2011; Hardy, 2017), it is 
today widely recognised as a central object of sociological concern. Firmly entrenched in public and 
social-scientific discourse, it is often used to capture socio-economic developments thought to have 
marked the advent of a distinctive form of ‘ontological experience’ (Neilson and Rossiter, 2008). As 
such, precarity tends to be characterised as a defining feature of contemporary economic and social 
life (Sennett, 1998; Bauman, 1999; Beck, 2000; Standing, 2011). On the one hand, the term denotes a 
condition induced by economic transformations such as the introduction of ‘flatter, leaner, more 
decentralized and more flexible forms of organization’ (Jessop, 2002: 100) and reduction of a range of 
safety nets such as welfare provisions and labour rights, by the neoliberal state (Standing, 2011).  On 
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the other, precarity is said to capture a range of experiences engendered by those measures. These 
include such phenomena as the lack of a ‘secure identity or sense of development achieved through 
work and lifestyle’ (Standing, 2011: 16), combined with the sense that existing conditions ‘threaten 
life in ways that appear to be outside of one’s control’ (Butler, 2009: i). Construed in those terms, 
precarity has both an objective and subjective dimension. It is, at once, a term capturing structural 
transformations, marked by the flexibilisation of the workplace and labour market, and one capturing 
the ‘deepest socio-psychological impact of flexibility’ mainly characterised by a ‘situation of endemic 
and permanent uncertainty’ (Bauman, 1999: 29). 
 Taken together, those two dimensions are, more often than not, said to constitute defining 
features of the present social malaise, on the basis of which several contemporary commentators have 
diagnosed the prospects for political action (see for example: Butler, 2004; Neilson and Rossiter, 2008; 
Standing, 2011 and 2014; Lorey, 2015; Schram, 2015). Any such diagnoses, however, must first rest 
on a robust understanding of the operations of power under neoliberalism and, more specifically, the 
role precarity plays in domination. For those reasons, this article proposes to tackle the politics of 
precarity predominantly through the prism of two scholars’ work, whose insights into neoliberal 
power have become highly influential: Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault. Notwithstanding some 
observable overlaps between their accounts of neoliberalism (Laval, 2017), each provides a unique 
understanding of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity in the contemporary 
operations of power. Consequently, each also offers a different basis upon which to conceptualise the 
politics of precarity. To begin with, Foucault’s own approach to power will be discussed. It will be 
shown that, despite some notable merits, reading precarity-induced domination through the lens of 
the neoliberal ‘art of government’ prevents critique from adequately realising the contemporary 
potential for emancipatory political action. Then, I turn to Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power. 
Here, it is shown that Bourdieu succeeds in overcoming some of the limitations of Foucault’s work. 
Finally, the value of the concept of ‘symbolic power’ for thinking emancipatory resistance is assessed 
in the light of Butler’s post-structuralist approach, which offers a possible avenue for theorising 
collective action in the age of precarity. It is argued that rather than abandoning Bourdieu’s approach 
in favour of Butler’s own, the task of conceptualising resistance to precarity is better served by 
complementing the French sociologist’s insights with those emanating from intersectionality theory. 
 
 
1. Foucault, precarity and the neoliberal ‘art of government’ 
When Foucault devised the concept of ‘governmentality’, aimed at capturing what he regarded as an 
entirely new regime of power, neoliberalism was at its infancy. Yet, by demonstrating ‘great foresight’ 
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(Laval, 2017: 64), the concept has influenced a broad range of contemporary analyses of 
neoliberalism1 and diagnoses of precarity, more specifically.2 The concept’s appeal stems from its 
capacity to recognise that ‘operations of power have become detached from recognisable structures 
of political responsibility and accountability’ (Cronin, 1996: 55); a claim bearing particular resonance 
with contemporary forms of life subjected to the rule of increasingly flexible, unpredictable and 
globalised financial and labour markets. In Foucault’s work, such a diffuse form of power is thought to 
succeed in securing domination through the cultivation of an entrepreneurial subjectivity, at the core 
of which lies a uniquely articulated exercise of freedom amidst insecurity. It is in his analysis of the 
neoliberal ‘art of government’ (2008) that the French philosopher provides some of his most valuable 
insights into the role precarity plays in domination.  
 Before directly tackling the issue of precarity-induced domination, it is first essential to clarify 
what Foucault had in mind by construing power in terms of governmentality:  
 
The exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the 
possible outcome. Basically power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the 
linking of one to the other than a question of government (Foucault, 1982: 789) 
 
Under such a reading, power is neither possessed, nor does it lead to a repressive form of 
domination, whereby individuals’ conduct is consciously manipulated by other individuals. Power, in 
fact, ‘doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no’ (Foucault, 1980: 119). Instead, it is ‘productive,’ 
insofar as it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces 
discourse’ (Foucault, 1980: 119). To suggest that it is ‘productive’ means that power is not so much 
responsible for prohibiting particular practices, as it is instrumental in guiding and normalising 
particular conducts. It means directing one’s attention to the conditions under which subjectivity is 
produced and generalised through the ‘discipline of bodies’ and ‘regulation of the population’ 
(Foucault, 2009). Thus, rather than acting as a repressive force as, for example, a ‘right to take life or 
let live’ (Foucault, 1990: 138) power turns the body into an ‘object of political strategy’ (Foucault, 
2009: 16) that, in the form of ‘biopower,’ aims to either ‘foster life or disallow it to the point of death’ 
(Foucault, 1990: 138). In his genealogy of the neoliberal subject, Foucault provides an insight into the 
kind of biopolitics marking the neoliberal age. More specifically, he traces the emergence of an 
entrepreneurial subjectivity, understood as the contingent outcome of biopolitical state interventions 
guiding ‘the possibility of conduct’ through ‘competitive mechanisms’ that ‘play a regulatory role at 
every moment and every point in society’ (Foucault, 2008: 145).  
4 
 
The neoliberal art of government’s success, therefore, lies in its capacity to compel the 
individual to become an ‘entrepreneur of himself [sic]’ (Foucault, 2008: 145), by adopting the form of 
conduct thought to be most appropriate for the various challenges posed by the ‘dynamic of 
competition’ (Foucault, 2008: 147). Since individuals are active in its production and because it is 
‘generalized to all aspects of existence’ (Lazzarato, 2008: 121), that entrepreneurial subjectivity is all-
encompassing and, consequently, acts as a prism through which all decisions come to be rationalised 
and individuals come to ‘accept,’ and adjust to the reality of personal responsibility, competition and 
precarious life (Foucault, 2008: 269). It follows that no analytical or empirical distinction between the 
‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ interests (Lukes, 2015) of individuals can effectively be made, for no true 
or real interests are said to exist outside the subjectivity in question. Truth and interests can change, 
but in virtue of their discursive character, they are dependent on the emergence of an entirely new 
regime of truth; of a new subjectivity. 
But how can the successful operationalisation of neoliberal governmentality be explained? I 
propose to answer this question by probing how Foucault made sense of the historically distinctive 
interplay between freedom and precarity in advanced capitalist societies. Let me begin by tackling the 
role played by precarity in the operation of neoliberal domination. With the subjection of society to 
the imperatives of the market, ‘individuals are constantly exposed to danger, or rather, they are 
conditioned to experience their situation, their life, their present, and their future as containing 
danger’ (Foucault, 2008: 66). This is explained by the ‘permanent fear of failure’ (Lemke, 2012: 49) 
induced by the individualisation of risk and responsibility. The constant necessity to adjust to 
unpredictable and rapidly changing circumstances underpins the normalisation of behaviour. Under 
such a state of affairs, precarity performs the role of central regulatory mechanism in society, for by 
‘perpetuating a “mobilizing” uncertainty’ (Lazzarato, 2009: 119), it compels individuals to act as 
entrepreneurs and accept the imperative of self-adjustment. Drawing on Foucault’s own approach to 
domination, Isabell Lorey (2015: 111) depicted ‘precarisation’ as a process ‘designed to make 
individuals governable’ (Lorey, 2015: 111). Put differently, ‘fear’ turns into ‘the basis and motive for 
the constitution of the responsible, reliable, and rational self’ (Lemke, 2012: 50), which are defining 
features of a conduct appropriate for an ‘enterprise society’ (Foucault, 2008: 147). Neoliberal 
governmentality, then, thrives on ‘a culture of danger’ (Foucault, 2008: 66), which various forms of 
state intervention, such as the withdrawal of welfare provisions, privatisation programmes, the 
financialisation of the economy and flexibilisation of labour markets play a key role in cultivating. But 
as we shall now see, those interventions also serve to mobilise a drive to ‘produce’ one’s ‘own 
satisfaction’ (Foucault, 2008: 226), inseparable from the ‘culture of danger’ depicted above. 
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 Indeed, in an effort to understand what is historically distinctive about the operations of 
power in advanced capitalist societies, Foucault provided several illuminating insights into the search 
for satisfaction marking individuals’ conduct. Under this reading, satisfaction is said to presuppose 
freedom, namely the freedom to choose. But like risk and responsibility, satisfaction is individualised. 
Individuals have effectively become personally responsible for choosing their own desires and 
securing the means for realising them. This contemporary ‘man [sic] of consumption,’ Foucault goes 
on to argue, ‘insofar as he consumes, is a producer. What does he produce? Well, quite simply, he 
produces his own satisfaction’ (Foucault, 2008: 226). As Anthony Giddens (1994: 54) himself noted, 
contemporary consumers have ‘no choice but to choose.’ Choosing, here, means to take risks, or as 
Dardot and Laval (2013: 276) put it, ‘[t]o follow one’s desires is to run risks.’  
 Here, one can begin to appreciate two core features of neoliberal governmentality. On the 
one hand, this new art of government rests on the mutual reciprocity of freedom and precarity: to run 
risks, individuals have to be made free, but to exercise this freedom, they must be in a position to take 
risks. In fact, like the culture of danger, freedom has to be ‘constantly produced’ (Foucault, 2008: 65), 
and both reinforce each other in compelling individuals to adopt an entrepreneurial conduct. On the 
other hand, one observes a striking paradox. For, amid a culture of danger individuals exercise their 
freedom in such a way as to adjust to reality. They use their freedom to adjust to the principles of a 
market society. So, while they are free, they are effectively free to adjust. Freedom, therefore, acts as 
an instrument of subjection to the established order.   
However, while Foucault recognised the generalised and all-encompassing character of 
entrepreneurial subjectivity and insisted on the combined operationalisation of danger and freedom 
in its production, he anticipated the possibility for resistance to pre-existing operations of power in 
the form of ‘counter-conducts’ (Foucault, 2009). To resist power in this way entails a ‘struggle against 
the processes implemented for conducting others’ (Foucault, 2009: 268) holding ‘the promise of 
becoming a new form of conduct itself’ (Larsen, 2011: 42).  Since ‘power is everywhere’ (Foucault, 
1998: 63) and can never be fully eliminated from social life, Foucault does not wish to suggest that 
power itself ought to be overcome. Instead, he conceptualises resistance as a conduct based on an 
autonomous and independent mode of subjectivation. Rather than anticipating collective action, in 
the form of a movement or a party both directed at institutions and seeking to overcome particular 
structures of oppression, Foucault insisted on a form of resistance ‘that tries to avoid the managing of 
population policies and institutions by acting differently’ (Lilia and Vinthagen, 2013: 121).  
Such an approach to resistance is echoed in the work of post-structuralist theorists of 
precarity and resistance, influenced by the French philosopher (see for example Butler, 2004; Neilson 
and Rossiter, 2008; Dardot and Laval, 2013; Lorey, 2015; McCormack and Salmenniemi, 2016). With 
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Foucault, they recognise that contemporary power is such that one ought to turn away from a 
conceptualisation of resistance postulating a collective subject. This rejection of a philosophy of 
consciousness effectively means a rejection of resistance construed in terms of ‘international 
solidarity’ or a ‘struggle for mutual recognition that binds subjects in relations of identity and 
difference’ (Neilson and Rossiter, 2008: 65). For Butler (2004; 2011), precarity is even said to offer 
fresh opportunities for resistance, albeit of an entirely new kind. In virtue of marking a universally 
shared ontological experience, precarity holds the potential for eliciting a ‘vulnerability to loss and the 
task of mourning that follows’ (Butler, 2004: 19), highly productive for the recognition that ‘[f]reedom 
does not come from me or you; it can and does happen as a relation between us or, indeed, among 
us’ (Butler, 2011: 7). Drawing from such claims, and in an effort to ‘develop a political and social 
theoretical perspective that starts from the connectedness with others and takes different dimensions 
of the precarious into consideration,’ Lorey (2015: 15) provides an insight into the kind of ‘counter-
conduct’ appropriate for the age of precarity. Here one finds a plethora of ‘singular refusals, the small 
sabotages and resistances of precarious everyday life’ (Lorey, 2015: 111) that ‘focus on care’ and 
intend ‘to acknowledge our relationality with others’ (Lorey, 2015: 94), against the ‘disciplining of 
governmental precarization’ (Lorey, 2015: 111) based on ‘possessive-individualist self-relations’ Lorey, 
2015: 29). Thus, it follows that 
 
[t]o neo-liberal governmentality as a specific way of conducting the conduct of others, we 
must […] oppose a no less specific double refusal: a refusal to conduct oneself toward oneself 
as a personal enterprise and a refusal to conduct oneself towards others in accordance with 
the norm of competition (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 320) 
 
In order to resist precarity, Foucaultian approaches of the kind discussed above propose to 
turn governmentality against itself. For, they propose to harness the productive and potentially 
subversive character of individualising processes of neoliberal subjectivation for the adoption of a 
conduct opposed to entrepreneurialism. Here, fear and danger are channelled into a conduct marked 
by the acceptance of vulnerability (the mourning of precarity), on the basis of which a recognition of 
one’s relationality with others can begin to be subjectivated. Subjectivation may be autonomous and 
independent but it is one capable of asserting our connectedness with others. While neoliberal 
subjectivity entails individuals conducting themselves as free beings pitted against other beings, 
precarity holds the potential to open up the scope for conducting oneself as a being asserting their 
freedom relationally.  
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While Foucault’s post-structuralism offers immensely valuable insights into the operations of 
neoliberal power, it nevertheless faces a range of non-negligible conceptual difficulties when 
confronted with the task of grasping the nature and full potential of resistance under the 
contemporary age of precarity. Let me begin by reviewing its core merits. As emphasised above, 
Foucault expressed a particular concern for explaining how, in their experience of being a (neoliberal) 
subject, individuals are confronted with a unique interplay between freedom and precarity, said to 
perform an essential function in securing their subjection to the ‘dynamic of competition.’ Under such 
a reading, domination is experienced neither as manipulation nor as repression. Instead, it thrives on 
the freedom neoliberal subjects exercise in their continuous attempt to rise to the perpetual 
challenges posed by precarity. Thus, because individuals actively participate in their own subjection 
to the established order, this account of power can help understand elements of the logic through 
which the neoliberal political-economic order succeeds in maintaining itself. The imperative to choose 
to adjust oneself to a rapidly changing and unpredictable environment confronts neoliberal subjects 
as a force promoting adaptation, while undermining the value and desirability of conducts that fall 
short of facilitating it. 
 But, by recognising the effects of the process through which risk and responsibility are 
individualised, i.e. precarisation, on society at large, Foucault was in a position to identify additional 
obstacles to resistance. Indeed, drawing from Foucault’s work, Lorey (2015: 9) observed that the 
‘precarious’ are ‘isolated and individualized’ subjects. They also tend to experience their precarity as 
an ‘anxiety towards others who cause harm’ (Lorey, 2015: 21). The age of precarity, then, does not 
only compel individuals to favour adaptation over subversion, but also tends to pit individuals against 
one another, thereby posing numerous challenges for collective action. Those remarks may not only 
explain, at least partly, the failure of such an internally differentiated anti-austerity protest movement 
as the Occupy Movement to materialise into large-scale social change, but can also shed light on the 
factors leading to divisive electoral campaigns such as the 2016 presidential election in the US or the 
EU referendum in the UK. While the former struggled to assert unity in the face of seemingly 
conflictual interests (Taylor et al. 2011), the latter could be regarded as political responses 
symptomatic of an anxiety-induced form of othering, whereby the ‘permanent fear of failure’ turns 
into a source of self-defence, amid a shared but differentiated condition of precarity between 
American rustbelt workers and immigrant workers, and between UK citizens and immigrant EU 
workers.  
 Despite those strengths, it is possible to observe some non-negligible limitations. While those 
are predominantly associated with the conceptualisation of resistance offered by Foucaultian 
approaches, they can be traced back to the treatment of the ‘subject as an effect of disciplinary 
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technologies’ (Cronin, 1996: 73) and a failure to appreciate the diverse social positions from which 
individuals differentially come to adopt the entrepreneurial conduct. Concerning the first issue, it is 
important to note that while construing power as diffuse and examining the conditions responsible 
for upholding an entrepreneurial subjectivity, are crucial steps towards understanding the logic of 
precarity-induced domination, they need not entail the postulation of an all-encompassing 
subjectivity ‘float[ing] free of any specific social relations’ (Cronin, 1996: 60). While doing so ‘runs the 
risk of reducing power to a play of forces unconnected with recognizable human concerns’ (Cronin, 
1996: 60), it also means rejecting the possibility for individuals to discern the ‘better from the worse 
sets of practices and forms of constraints (Fraser, 1989: 32). Power, here, turns out to be not only 
diffuse but also impersonal. The source of domination and enemy of struggles of resistance remains 
faceless. For, neoliberal subjects are said to be confronted with an all-encompassing and all-absorbing 
process of subjectivation divorced from recognisable structures of oppression and outside of which 
‘no objective standpoint […] from which the truth could be ascertained’ (Cronin, 1996: 62) can exist. 
Thus, because the subject is understood as an effect, his approach fails to open up the scope for 
contesting the legitimacy of social relations and practices and, with it, that of a life governed by 
precarity. In turn, it becomes difficult to grasp how neoliberal subjects could eventually be motivated 
to engage in counter-conducts.3  
 But as noted above, approaches inspired by Foucault’s work have sought to ground the 
possibility for resistance in the productive power of precarity. For Butler (2004; 2011) and Lorey 
(2015), the condition of precarity holds the potential for recognising our relationality with others, 
providing they are in a position to embrace their vulnerability. Whether construed in terms of ‘bodies 
in alliance’ (Butler, 2011) or as conducts that focus on care (Lorey, 2015), relationality is 
conceptualised in such a way that it offers insufficient scope for thinking resistance in terms of a 
collective mobilisation against practices social agents wish to be liberated from, and in defence of 
those they wish to realise freedom with. Counter-conducts, in this sense, are not expected to be 
regarded as more legitimate than entrepreneurial conducts, but simply opposed to them. Those 
approaches, therefore, suffer from a lack of insight into those mechanisms capable of collectively 
asserting the legitimacy of particular conducts and translating individual counter-conducts into 
institutional change. Just like Foucault, they fall short of demonstrating how dispersed micro-level 
struggles can ‘become stabilised into enduring strategic patterns’ (Cronin, 1996: 63).  
 This leads me onto a final issue Foucault fails to address adequately, namely the differentiated 
experiences of the burdens of risk, personal responsibility and precarity, more generally. While 
reading his texts on neoliberal governmentality, one could be forgiven to think that neoliberal subjects 
exercise their freedom and negotiate the imperatives of the market in a uniform manner. This is 
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because Foucault did little to reflect on the way one’s position in society can affect how social agents 
conduct themselves as entrepreneurial subjects. Take the example of ridesharing workers such as the 
‘self-employed’ Uber drivers, who are free to decide when to work and where to drive, but have to 
bear the responsibility for their car’s maintenance costs, along with little or no access to a range of 
employment rights and benefits such as those enjoyed by salaried workers. Some of those drivers 
have a regular and stable job but choose to earn extra cash at weekends. Others are full-time Uber 
drivers. Both types of drivers are indeed likely to relate to precarity in a very different way. This, in 
turn, points to the importance of adequately recognising the extent to which one’s economic (and 
cultural) resources shape one’s own experience of precarity.  
 By contrast, the strength of Bourdieu’s work lies in its capacity to grasp the importance of 
individual agents’ own social position in understanding the role of precarity in domination. His work 
can also help overcome other problems found in Foucault’s work, such as its incapacity to anticipate 
agents in a position to assert the legitimacy and illegitimacy of particular practices. Let me now turn 
to a discussion of his work.  
 
2. Bourdieu, precarity and ‘symbolic power’ 
Bourdieu and Foucault rarely discussed each other’s work publicly. This may seem particularly 
surprising given their shared interest in neoliberalism and, of course, the fact that both held a chair at 
the Collège de France, albeit at different time-periods. Bourdieu did nevertheless write a poignant 
obituary entitled ‘The Pleasure of Knowing’4 (1984), mourning the loss of a ‘friend’ and celebrating the 
genius of Foucault. Despite the immense intellectual respect Bourdieu held towards the philosopher, 
the few scattered references he makes to his work indicate a rather critical appraisal of Foucault’s 
ideas (Callewaert, 2006).5 Take, for example, the following passage:  
 
There is, it is true, a side of Foucault’s work (there is of course, considerable more to this work 
than that) which theorizes the revolt of the adolescent in trouble with his family and with the 
institutions that relay family pedagogy and impose ‘disciplines’ (the school, the clinic, the 
asylum, the hospital and so on), that is, forms of social constraint that are very external. 
Adolescent revolts often represent symbolic denegations, utopian responses to general social 
controls that allow you to avoid carrying out a full analysis of the specific historical forms, and 
especially of the differential forms, assumed by the constraints that bear on agents from 
different milieux, and also of forms of social constraint much more subtle than those that 




 By evoking the image of the adolescent in depicting Foucault’s work, Bourdieu wishes to 
convey the message that it excludes from its scope the analysis a range of mechanisms the French 
sociologist deems essential for understanding the operations of power in society. The mechanisms in 
question are those involved in the internalisation of schemes of perception or, put differently, the 
objectivation of particular representations. But what exactly limits Foucault’s capacity to engage in 
such a theoretical exercise? In my answer to this question, I intend to expose the distinctive features 
and merits of Bourdieu’s own approach to domination. I begin by tackling Bourdieu’s attempt to 
overcome the tension between subjectivism and objectivism. I then turn to his analysis of the various 
mechanisms involved in what he called ‘symbolic domination,’ in an effort to examine how, under its 
guise, domination through, and resistance to, precarity come to be conceptualised. 
In the Logic of Practice, Bourdieu (1990: 25) famously claimed that ‘[o]f all the oppositions 
that artificially divide social science, the most fundamental, and the most ruinous, is the one that is 
set up between subjectivism and objectivism.’ Subjectivism sets out to research the social by 
examining agents’ subjectivity, i.e. their experience of social reality. The objectivist, on the other hand, 
is interested in studying the regularities of social life. In order to do so, he/she will seek a focus on the 
forces, structures etc. responsible for the regularities or patterns in question.  For Bourdieu, reducing 
the sociological endeavour to one or the other task is mistaken and sociologically pernicious, for there 
is no such thing as a social world either external to individuals’ own practices or inseparable from the 
knowledge of agents. Adopting one or the other stance would ultimately mean ignoring a range of 
mechanisms essential for understanding how the social world operates. It would make it impossible 
for the sociologist to explain ‘the coincidence of the objective structures and the internalized 
structures which provides the illusion of immediate understanding’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 26). In short, it 
would prevent the sociologist from understanding how social reality comes to be experienced by 
agents as ‘truth’ or a ‘self-evident’ reality, ‘established, settled once and for all, beyond discussion’ 
(Bourdieu, 2000: 174).  
Seen in this light, the charge levelled at Foucault in the previous section of this article begins 
to be fully appreciated. While probing modes of subjectivation, as Foucault does, can shed light on the 
way individuals come to conduct themselves, a predominant focus on them turns attention away from 
the ‘objectivity that runs through the supposed site of subjectivity’ in the form of ‘social categories of 
thought, perception and appreciation which are the unthought principle of all representation of the 
“objective” world’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 21). In short, while we find discussions of discursive forms diffused 
through a range of institutions, no explanation of their conversion into schemes of perception 
structuring subjectivity is offered. As a result, it excludes an account of the modes of objectivation, 
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through which particular representations of the world are internalised and integrated into agents’ 
conducts.  
It is by paying attention to the way ‘dominant representations come to be objectivated 
perpetually in things’ (Bourdieu and Boltanski, 1976: 55) that Bourdieu could be said to fill the gaps of 
Foucault’s approach to power. While, like Foucault, Bourdieu (2000: 141) recognises that ‘[w]e learn 
bodily,’ he emphasises that we do so from the ‘positions [we] occupy in an objective space of 
constraints and facilitations and with cognitive tools issued from that very space’ (Wacquant, 2013: 
277). The social space in question is said to be responsible for producing ‘systems of durable, 
transposable dispositions, […] which generate and organize practices and representations,’ otherwise 
known as the ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 53). As such, the concept aims to capture a set of mechanisms 
instrumental in organising conducts and directs attention towards the ‘necessity of the social world’ 
(Bourdieu, 1990: 52). Put simply, one’s social position shapes the habitus which, in turn, produces 
regularities and patterns of action that cause agents’ practices and experiences of reality to be socially 
structured. With this concept Bourdieu is not merely ‘concerned to understand the logic of practices’ 
(Bourdieu, 1990: 16), he also wishes to explain the ‘practical experience of the familiar universe’ 
(Bourdieu, 1990: 26), or how, from their own position within a given social space, agents come to treat 
reality as self-evident. Thus, he intends to overcome the tension between subjectivism and 
objectivism by exploring how ‘incorporated cognitive structures attuned to the objective structures’ 
(Bourdieu, 2000: 178) are produced.6 This is achieved by a consistent focus on ‘conditionings imposed 
by the material conditions of existence, by the insidious injunctions and “inert violence” […] of 
economic and social structures and of the mechanisms through which they are reproduced’ (Bourdieu, 
2000: 141). 
However, according to Bourdieu, agents equipped with their habitus, also have to confront a 
state that ‘institutes and inculcates common symbolic forms of thought, social frames of perception 
[…] practical schemes of perception, appreciation and action’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 175). Here the state is 
said to act as the ‘foundation of […] an immediate, prereflexive consensus on the meaning of the 
world’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 172). As such, it plays a central role in the production and diffusion of precisely 
what comes to be internalised, namely the ‘systems of classification and of mental structures’ 
(Bourdieu, 1991: 169). But, insisting on the significance of the socially organised character of society, 
Bourdieu adds that those schemes of perception turn out to be ‘objectively adjusted to social 
structures’ (Bourdieu, 1991: 169), in such a way that the meanings associated with a phenomenon like 
precarity, are differentiated according to one’s own social position.  
To construe the exercise of power in the above terms, then, entails exploring the processes 
and forces at play in the production, cultivation and diffusion of symbols successful in securing 
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individuals’ adjustment to reality. It means to speak of a ‘symbolic’ kind of power and a ‘symbolic’ kind 
of domination. But to be successful, that is, to secure adjustment to, and acceptance, of reality, this 
form of domination must first ensure an ‘apprehension of the established order as natural 
(orthodoxy)’ (Bourdieu, 1991: 169). It must cultivate the self-evidence and, therefore inevitability, of 
the given social reality or, as Bourdieu himself put it, secure the ‘doxic submission to the established 
order’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 178). Construed as an organ of domination, the state is the outlet through 
which agents who ‘had an interest in giving universal form to the particular expression of their 
interests’ (Bourdieu, 2014: 175) can effectively impose their own schemes of perception on society at 
large. Contrary to Foucault, then, Bourdieu chooses to ground power in ‘domestic political decisions 
that reflect the tipping of the balance of class forces in favour of the owners of capital’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 2001: 4; emphasis in original), who possess ‘the means of making’ their interests ‘come 
true’ (Bourdieu and Boltanski, 1976, abstract). The result, Bourdieu (2000) further contends, is a state 
of ‘misrecognition,’ whereby agents adhere to an arbitrary reality. But Bourdieu insisted that ‘[a]ll 
symbolic domination presupposes, on the part of those who submit to it, a form of complicity which 
is neither passive submission to external constraint nor a free adherence to values’ (Bourdieu, 1991: 
50-1). The so-called ‘fit between the subjective structures and the objective structures’ (Bourdieu, 
1977: 168), secured by the structuring role of the doxa, and regulated by the habitus, is in this sense 
the outcome of an active construction of social reality by the agents themselves.    
 What, then, could be the role of precarity in such a state of affairs? In an intervention made 
in Grenoble (France), entitled ‘Job insecurity is everywhere now,’ Bourdieu (1998) drew the contours 
of the operations of power under the guise of precarity: 
 
Casualization of employment is part of a mode of domination of a new kind, based on the 
creation of a generalized state of insecurity aimed at forcing workers into submission, into 
acceptance of exploitation. To characterize this mode of domination, which, although in its 
effects it closely resembles the wild capitalism of the early days, is entirely unprecedented, a 
speaker here proposed the very appropriate and expressive concept of flexploitation. 
(Bourdieu, 1998: 85) 
 
 While precarity is not new, its early manifestations failed to provide, as Eric Hobsbawm (1975: 
260) noted, a ‘really effective general mechanism for keeping labour hard at work.’ Today, however, 
the ‘generalization of precarious wage labour and social insecurity’ plays a much more subtle and 
insidious role in society. It is now a ‘privileged engine of economic activity’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
2001: 3), which economic and political elites come to justify on the basis of an imperative to maximise 
13 
 
the economic competitiveness of their economic space. But, to become such a central economic 
principle, precarity had to be made inevitable. It had to be naturalised.   
 The various discursive strategies adopted by political elites in the West, particularly those 
aimed at promoting labour market flexibility, provide a rather striking illustration of the operations of 
symbolic domination. Take, for example, the case of newly elected French President, Emmanuel 
Macron. Central to his campaign manifesto was the conviction that politics must create the conditions 
that will enable each individual to become masters of their own destiny, exercise their liberty and 
autonomously choose their way of life (Macron, 2016). To realise this so-called ‘promise of 
emancipation’ and release the creative energies of individuals, the French economy first has to be 
modernised (Macron, 2016). But by ‘modernisation,’ Macron means something very specific, namely 
removing a range of constraints allegedly responsible for a stagnant and encumbered labour market. 
In other words, modernisation means flexibilization. What one finds in this manifesto, then, is a 
principle of flexibility symbolically cultivated as a liberating and enabling operating principle of 
economic life, ‘touted as a virtue for capital and labour alike’ (Harvey, 2005: 53).  
 So, while in the work of Foucault the acceptance of risk and responsibility surfaces as an 
outcome of an almost magical interplay of various contingent forces compelling individuals to adopt 
an entrepreneurial conduct, Bourdieu offers a range of conceptual tools capable of grounding it in the 
actions of political elites aimed at cultivating flexibility as an empowering and economically beneficial 
principle of economic and personal life. But like Foucault, he recognises the unique mutual reciprocity 
between freedom and precarity. Bourdieu, in fact, went as far as claiming that the ‘distinctiveness of 
symbolic domination lies precisely in the fact that it assumes, of those who submit to it, an attitude 
which challenges the usual dichotomy of freedom and constraint’ (Bourdieu, 1991: 51). Under such a 
reading, constraints emanating from flexible markets come to be symbolically cultivated as 
empowering, and adjustment to the established order as a form of liberation. The naturalisation of 
precarity, namely its apprehension by agents as an inevitable condition of existence, could, in this 
sense, be regarded as the outcome of an ideological manoeuvre capable of securing the 
‘correspondence of structure [i.e. social agents’ habitus,] to structure [i.e. doxa]’ (Bourdieu, 1991: 
169).7  
 But precisely because of the ideological character of precarity, Bourdieu anticipated the 
possibility of an incongruity between subjective and objective structures. As such, he opens up the 
conceptual scope for a ‘margin of freedom’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 234) missing in Foucault’s work. In a rare 
burst of optimism, he even depicted the contemporary age of precarity as one particularly auspicious 




On the one hand, the generalization of […] occupational insecurity tends to multiply the 
situations of mismatch, which generate tensions and frustrations. There will be no return to 
those social universes in which the quasi-perfect coincidence between objective tendencies 
and subjective expectations made the experience of the world a continuous interlocking of 
confirmed expectations The lack of a future, previously reserved for the 'wretched of the 
earth', is an increasingly widespread, even modal experience. (Bourdieu, 2000: 234) 
 
 Life under the guise of precarity is here said to hold a rather large potential for recognising 
the arbitrariness of the established order and, consequently, questioning its legitimacy. To be sure – 
and Bourdieu fully acknowledges it by insisting on the socially relative character of the habitus – 
ontological experiences and apprehensions of precarity vary widely. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine, 
for example, national industrial workers relating to precarity in a manner identical to migrant workers 
or precariatised university lecturers. However, despite such pronounced differences, the age of 
precarity is such that the ‘fear [of] losing [one’s] status and secure place in the world’ (Millar, 2017: 5) 
is affecting an ever-greater proportion of workers across a wide range of occupations (della Porta, 
2015: 214). Consequently, all are also potentially united in exposing and condemning the tension 
between the symbolically cultivated ideal of individually responsibilised selves, accepting and thriving 
under the risks precarity throws at them, and the means they have at their disposal for meeting this 
ideal. 
 Thus, like Foucault, Bourdieu provided valuable insights into the role precarity plays in 
domination. But the French sociologist’s constructivist structuralism succeeds where Foucault’s post-
structuralism tends to fail. On the one hand, by equipping critique with the conceptual tools, e.g. 
habitus and doxa, capable of capturing the various subtle mechanisms structuring agents’ subjectivity, 
he is in a better position to complement the analysis of subjectivation with an account for the socially 
differentiated modes of objectivation responsible for individuals’ adjustment to the social world. On 
the other hand, by anticipating the possibility for ‘an objective crisis, capable of disrupting the close 
correspondence between the incorporated structures and the objective structures which produce 
them’, Bourdieu is able to postulate a moment for ‘political subversion’ (Bourdieu, 1991: 128). Little, 
however, is said about how the ‘cognitive subversion’ (Bourdieu, 1991: 128) this moment rests on can 
effectively lead to emancipatory political action (Cronin, 1996). This issue is tackled at length in the 
next section.  
 
 
3. Thinking emancipatory political action in the age of precarity  
15 
 
In his famous work entitled The Precariat, Guy Standing contends that the contemporary age of 
precarity offers fresh opportunities for ‘emancipatory egalitarianism’ (2011: 156). However, 
Standing’s diagnosis of the prospects for emancipatory political action rests on two problematic 
presuppositions: the somewhat taken-for-granted capacity for highly diverse groups of precarious 
individuals to unite against precarity and the lack of attention paid to its ideological deployment.  
 Indeed, under Standing’s reading, the ‘graduate with no future,’ as Paul Mason (2011) put it, 
the ‘precariatised’ male service worker, the ‘precariatised’ migrant workers etc., are all said to share 
the same ‘class’ conditions (Standing, 2011), with the potential to coordinate their actions and become 
a political subject sui generis. However, one is justified in questioning the capacity of these very 
diverse experiences of precarity to become the basis for a coherent programme of political action. 
While many of ‘precariatised’ groups may want greater ‘control over life’ (Standing, 2011: 155), what 
such demands specifically mean to these different groups may significantly differ. For instance, the 
demands for control of a national industrial worker may significantly differ from those of a migrant 
service worker. More therefore needs to be done to be able to elucidate the conditions favourable for 
unity amidst the diverse experiences of precarity. More problematically, however, Standing’s 
approach to emancipatory action fails to take into account an absolutely crucial characteristic of 
contemporary precarity, namely its function as mode of domination. While reading his work, one 
would be forgiven to think that advanced capitalist societies have witnessed immensely profound 
structural changes marked by the inexorable advance of temporary work. A close look at employment 
survey data both before and after the ‘Great Recession’ nevertheless reveals a strikingly different state 
of affairs. In both cases, long-term employment8 has increased among both female and male workers 
and both part-time and full-time jobs (Doogan, 2009 and 2015). The form of material precarisation 
Standing claims to be inflicting those societies does not, therefore, stand the test of evidence.  
 A turn to Bourdieu, however, entails recognising the part-manufactured character of 
precarity, which Standing, along with a range of contemporary social theorists (Bauman, 1999; Beck, 
2000; Giddens, 1991), fail to appreciate. They share the view that ‘structural change […] largely 
explains and expresses the subjective experience of widespread job insecurity’ (Doogan, 2015: 49). 
But, while Bourdieu (1998: 83) himself upheld that ‘objective insecurity gives rise to a generalized 
subjective insecurity,’ he regarded the correspondence in question as an outcome of the labour of 
symbolic power. For, under his reading, subjectivity is not merely structured by material forces such 
as labour markets, it is also structured by symbolic constraints such as those embodied in the doxa. 
Thinking politics in the age of precarity, therefore, ought to include an account of such operations of 
power. But, it too ought to understand symbolic power’s limits, along with the symbolic contradictions 
it inevitably engenders. 
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 Let me illustrate how the latter task could be undertaken. Take the example of Uber and Lyft 
drivers in the U.S. (Malin and Chandler, 2017) or conveyor belt workers in Bulgaria (Kofti, 2016). Many 
American ridesharing workers ‘overwhelmingly see their work as something flexible, fun, and even 
beneficial to the larger society’ (Malin and Chandler, 2017: 384). Several female conveyor belt workers 
also see flexibility as a source of ‘freedom’ and ‘independence,’ in contrast with the relations of 
dependence experienced in the household (Kofti, 2016). Now, to analyse those phenomena through 
the prism of misrecognition entails highlighting the role of symbolically cultivated symbols, such as 
individual empowerment, in the rationalisation of precarity. But it also entails revealing the possible 
cracks in the process. The Uber and Lyft drivers were, for example, conscious of ‘a number of anxieties 
and risks that mitigate this flexibility and freedom, such as having to deal with the uncertainties of 
their independent status’ (Malin and Chandler, 2017: 384). The female conveyor belt workers were 
conscious of the ‘exploitative’ nature of the ‘shop floor’ and ‘complained about inequalities at work’ 
(Kofti, 2016: 445). By experiencing a ‘splintered precarity’ (Malin and Chandler, 2017: 384), namely 
one situated between unfairness/risk and reward, they are forced into a position whereby precarity is 
rationalised on the basis of contradictory symbols or, as Luc Boltanski (2011) put it, a situation of 
‘hermeneutic contradiction.’9 It is this contradiction that could potentially lead to the kind of ‘objective 
crisis’ Bourdieu alludes to in his work. 
 Conscious of the ‘symbolic work needed in order to break out of the silent self-evidence of 
doxa’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 188), Bourdieu chose to devote his theoretical work on resistance to this more 
specific task, albeit at the expense of imagining the content of counter-symbolic struggles united 
against neoliberalism. But with such concepts as habitus, doxa and ‘objective crisis,’ Bourdieu sets up 
an analytical framework with the potential to think emancipation in terms of a struggle capable of 
reconciling what Duggan (2003) regarded as ‘unproductive battles over economic versus cultural 
politics, identity-based vs. left universalist rhetoric’ (Duggan, 2003: xix). However, it falls short of 
spelling out clearly how this can be achieved. For, thinking emancipation presupposes three 
conceptual moments: that of critical reflexivity performed at the individual level, that of cognitive 
subversion performed collectively and the passage from the former to the latter. Since Bourdieu’s 
work lacks, as Cronin (1996: 74) himself deplored, ‘a theory of individualization and hence of individual 
identity,’ it can offer little in the way of understanding how social agents come to cultivate ‘non-
repressive structures of self-identity’ (Cronin, 1996: 79). As a result, it lacks some of the insights that 
can help understand how the moment of cognitive subversion can be converted into a shared 
normative outlook. Before exploring the role intersectionality theory can play in filling those gaps, let 
me begin by reviewing the potential I alluded to above and addressing in greater detail Butler’s own 
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attempt at conceptualising collective resistance to precarity, which will help better understand the 
value of complementing Bourdieu’s approach with insights drawn from intersectionality theory. 
As a condition marked by both economic and cultural processes structuring the social world, 
precarity is both a socio-economic and ‘cultural condition’ (della Porta, 2015: 213). The concept of 
habitus itself aims to capture structuring mechanisms that are both material and cultural, with the 
potential to grasp how one’s class position, but also one’s gender (McCall, 1992; Laberge, 1995) and 
one’s race (Sallaz, 2010; Perry, 2012) shape how precarity is both experienced and apprehended. The 
concept of ‘objective crisis’ entails the possibility for social agents to recognise and contest the 
arbitrariness of precarity secured by the doxa. As such, it rests on harnessing the presence of 
contradictory symbols with which one’s own relationship to precarity is rationalised for recognising 
the narrow interests lying behind dominant representations of precarity. But for an emancipatory 
struggle to emerge, individuals must be in a position to contest the self-evidence of precarity 
collectively. Since individuals share the structuring influence of the neoliberal doxa on their 
subjectivity, the labour of ‘cognitive subversion’ identified by Bourdieu holds the potential for serving 
as a basis upon which to form a shared symbolic struggle, amid the diverse experiences of precarity-
induced domination. But, while his work succeeds in capturing some of the shared and differentiated 
components of the structural organisation of subjective experience under precarity, it falls short of 
spelling out the form of resistance a collective contestation of precarity entails. 
Although Butler, like Bourdieu, recognises that the experience of precarity is ‘differentially 
distributed throughout society’ (Butler, 2015: 15), her work sought to provide a more detailed and 
complete picture of the process of collectivisation in resistance than the one found in the work of the 
French sociologist. Drawing on Foucault’s concept of biopower, namely the power to ‘foster life or 
disallow it to the point of death,’ she depicts the singularity of the contemporary age of precarity as a 
new manifestation of the ‘idea that some populations are considered disposable’ (Butler, 2015: 11). 
Under such a reading, individuals with diverse experiences of precarity are said to share the 
ontological experience of disposability and, consequently, hold the potential to act in concert to ‘ward 
off the prospect of oblivion’ (Butler, 2015: 181). But, instead of anticipating a counter-symbolic 
struggle resting on a collectively shared cognitive subversion à la Bourdieu, Butler understands 
resistance in ‘performative’ terms, that is, as a form of bodily enactment realised through assemblies 
such as those making up the Occupy Wall Street movement. ‘Bodies in alliance’ perform the ‘right to 
appear,’ call into question the legitimacy of precarity and enact a ‘demand for livable lives’ (Butler, 
215: 218).  Thus, individuals united in resistance do not so much draw their unity from a collectively 
rationalised subversion of structures of oppression as from a recognition of their shared vulnerability 
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and ‘mutual dependency,’ thought to ‘open the way to a form of improvisation in the course of 
devising collective institutional ways of addressing induced precarity’ (Butler, 2015: 22).  
In contrast with Bourdieu, whose concept of habitus tends to emphasise the regulated 
character of bodily acts, Butler is keen to expose the empowering character of such acts and defends 
her own conception of resistance on the fact that ‘what is bodily in speech resists and confounds the 
very norms by which it is regulated’ (Butler, 1997: 142). Like Foucault, then, she construes resistance 
in terms of counter-conducts, or bodily enacted refusals to ‘conduct oneself towards others in 
accordance with the norm of competition.’ But in an effort to overcome a limitation of his approach 
identified in the first part of this piece, she insists on showing how it can be performed collectively 
and without ‘making presumptions about who is included and who is not’ (Butler, 2015: 4). Resistance, 
in this sense, is both collective and plural. However, because resistance is construed as performative 
and, as such, relies on the indeterminacy, instability and temporality of bodily enactments, it remains 
difficult to grasp how collective counter-conducts can be expected to turn into ‘enduring strategic 
patterns.’ Little is in fact said about the kind of cognitive labour that will eventually be required to 
address the diverse experiences of precarity in the struggle to ‘devise institutional ways of addressing 
induced precarity.’ Furthermore, while it is reasonable to treat vulnerability as a ‘condition of 
resistance’ (Butler, 2015: 184) in an increasingly insecure and uncertain world, it would be 
unreasonable to suggest that it is a sufficient one. For, despite the existence of ‘neoliberal forms of 
power’ destroying the possibility for meeting the moral ideal cultivated by ‘neoliberal rationality’ itself 
(Butler, 2015: 14), precarity continues to reign supreme. More than a reliance on a merely shared 
condition of vulnerability and bodily enacted ‘demand for livable lives’ may therefore be required for 
fully grasping the prospects for lasting resistance under the contemporary age of precarity. Thus, while 
Bourdieu may have insufficiently accounted for the conditions under which resistance comes to be 
collectivised, Butler’s own conceptualisation is limited in its capacity to anticipate the conversion of a 
moment of collectively performed subversion into a potential force for institutional change. As a 
result, the scope of her analysis excludes an explanation of the way in which the ontological 
experiences of precarity can be traced back to the structures of power and domination engendering 
it. Such a shortcoming is attributable to the post-structuralist stance she adopts and the concomitant 
refusal to accept that a meaningfully plural collectivisation of resistance can emerge from a shared 
recognition and condemnation of the mechanisms responsible for securing precarity-induced 
domination.  
How, then, can a process of collectivisation capable of accommodating plurality in a shared 
and rationalised contestation of precarity’s self-evidence be conceptualised? To answer this question, 
I propose to turn to intersectionality theory.  As an ‘analytical tool’ (Collins and Bilge, 2016) central to 
19 
 
identifying coalitions, even between seemingly disparate forms of domination, it can perform an 
essential role for rationalising domination and guiding collectivisation in resistance. It is, first and 
foremost, a tool concerned with ‘the way things work rather than who people are’ (Chun, Lispitz and 
Shin, 2013: 923). More specifically, it is concerned with accounting for ‘multiple grounds of identity 
when considering how the social world is constructed’ (Crenshaw, 1991: 1245). Experiences of 
precarity are, it follows, differentiated according to one’s class, gender, race, nationality etc. How one 
apprehends the reality of precarity, therefore, depends on one’s social position, itself the outcome of 
overlapping structures of power and domination. It follows that a white working-class male, for 
example, will experience domination and apprehend the reality of precarity differently from a black 
working-class woman. But structural intersectionality does not so much wish to highlight differences 
in domination and resistance as open up the scope for a deeper ‘understanding of social, political, and 
economic injustice’ thought to be ‘vital’ for ‘individual transformation’ and ‘the direct experience of 
new forms of connection and solidarity’ with other dominated groups (Chun, Lispitz and Shin, 2013: 
934). It does not consist in denying the possibility for collective action; rather, it presupposes that 
unity against a condition like precarity can only be fruitfully mobilised by recognising within-group 
differences and preventing the subordination of a set of interests to another (Crenshaw, 1991; Chun, 
Lispitz and Shin, 2013). Unlike Foucault and Butler, then, this approach to resistance presupposes a 
collectively articulated subject of resistance. But intersectionality theory anticipates the formation of 
such a subject through the connections it is in a position to inform by making explicit the overlapping 
structures of precarity-induced domination, while, in a manner echoing Butler’s own concern, 
rejecting ‘the subordination of one oppression to another’ (Chun, Lispitz and Shin, 2013: 918). By 
demonstrating the role intersectionality can play in challenging power ‘in multiple sites and on 
multiple scales,’ Chun et al. (2013: 929) were in a position to explain how such an analytical tool can 
turn into a ‘social movement strategy’ for, on the one hand, individual empowerment and, on the 
other, asserting unity amid diverse experiences of domination. Such a post-identitarian form of 
collective resistance, therefore, holds the potential for accommodating the plurality of precarity-
induced experiences, while providing insights into the kind of cognitive labour required for forging 
lasting strategic alliances.  
Furthermore, intersectionality theorists recognise, like Bourdieu, that despite developing a 
subjectivity conditioned by their position in society, which presupposes that ‘[e]ach group speaks from 
its standpoint and shares its own partial, situated knowledge’ (Collins, 2000: 270), dominated groups 
can engage in a collective ‘conversion of the vision of the world’ (Bourdieu, 1991: 128). In 
intersectionality terms, this entails a ‘counter-hegemonic and transformative knowledge production’ 
(Bilge, 2013: 405) or, to put it differently, a cognitive – as opposed to bodily – enactment of a 
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‘collective we’ (Collins and Bilge, 2016: 135). Intersectionality, thus, provides an analytical tool with 
which the ontological experience of precarity is rationalised as the outcome of (overlapping) 
structures of power and domination. In this sense, the process through which individuals come to both 
elucidate the conditions responsible for their individual experiences of precarity and rationalise ‘non-
repressive structures of self-identity’ results from, rather than underpins, the recognition that 
precarity-induced domination is imbued with a systematic and differentiated character. Through the 
prism of intersectionality, ‘people derive their identities from their politics rather than their politics 
from their identities’ (Chun, Lispitz and Shin, 2013: 937). Empowerment, that is, the state of asserting 
one’s dissatisfaction with existing social reality, is at once individual and collective. Finally, and 
crucially for the goal set out in this article, by ‘developing awareness of inequalities along multiple 
dimensions [that] is achieved organically over time’ (Cho, Crenshaw and McCall, 2013: 803), 
intersectionality could be understood as facilitating the rationalised contestation of precarity’s self-
evidence. Put differently, it facilitates the recognition of seemingly impersonal operations of power as 
personal relations of domination. For, under its guise, one comes to grasp the values and interests 
structuring social reality, in such a way that inequalities are no longer perceived as personal 
shortcomings or that the individualisation of risk and responsibility contributing to the precarisation 
of life comes to be grasped as the result of decisions aligned with the values and interests of the 
socially dominant.  
In sum, while intersectionality exhibits an emancipatory intent in line with Bourdieu’s own 
vision of resistance, it also acts as an analytical tool particularly adequate for delineating the power 
relations making up social reality and facilitating the collectivisation of resistance. As such, it provides 




Despite inspiring a range of contemporary theorisations of politics in the age of precarity, Foucault’s 
conceptual apparatus falls short of equipping critique with the appropriate tools for calling into 
question the inevitability of precarity. By postulating a subject understood as an outcome of all-
pervasive disciplinary techniques with uniform effects, Foucault’s post-structuralism tends to under-
appreciate the importance of accounting for the diverse experiences of precarity. Furthermore, his 
analysis of the processes involved in the production of the subject lacks the sort of conceptual 
resources adequate for grasping the objectivating mechanisms involved in structuring social agents’ 
subjectivity. As a result, critique is left with very few means with which to anticipate a moment of 
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cognitive subversion that, while socially differentiated, provides a political impulse for resisting the 
shared but repressive structuring processes supported by precarity.  
Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic domination, however, goes a long way towards overcoming 
those limitations. It not only offers a conceptual frame of analysis concerned with grasping the 
interplay of modes of subjectivation and modes of objectivation involved in cultivating the self-
evidence of precarity, but also arms critique with the penetrating insights for apprehending the limits 
of, and cracks within, the neoliberal regime of symbolic domination. It was nevertheless suggested 
that in order to enhance critique’s capacity to subvert dominant symbolic forms, more needed to be 
done regarding the conversion of cognitive subversion into a basis for collective action. While the work 
of Butler raises a range of important issues for theorising collective action, such as the value of 
cultivating plurality in resistance, her work is, like Foucault’s, limited in its capacity to envisage lasting 
alliances.  For this reason, it was argued that the task of conceptualising resistance in the age of 
precarity is better served by supplementing Bourdieu’s own approach to domination with the 
analytical tool offered by intersectionality theory. For, the latter holds the potential to assert, 
cognitively, unity amid the diversity of precarity-induced experiences, and facilitate the formation of 
lasting alliances around a shared opposition to diverse relations of domination. 
Despite its divisive and existentially troubling character, therefore, precarity does offer some 
non-negligible opportunities for emancipatory political action. To be sure, under the present situation, 
such a prospect seems like a rather distant one, not least because of precarity’s tendency to provoke 
reactionary political responses, as exemplified by recent political outcomes in Europe and the US. But, 
while neoliberalism has undeniably succeeded in ‘making itself true and empirically verifiable’ 
(Bourdieu, 1998: 95; emphasis in original) through the generalisation of insecurity and fear, it is also 
responsible for generalising a condition of servitude gradually becoming intolerable for a large 
proportion of the population, both within and outside Western capitalist societies. Success in 
capitalising on a possible ‘objective crisis’ in the neoliberal regime of symbolic domination may 
nevertheless depend on forms of political action substituting an all-too-widespread defensive and 
potentially reactionary look into the past, with the hopeful and potentially progressive outlook of a 
shared and collectively cultivated vision of the future.  
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